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Alexei Navalny and Russia's ‘conscience’ wars 
By Philip Boobbyer, Reader in History, University of Kent 
 
When Alexei Navalny returned to Russia in January, he emphasised that Russia was 
his home and that he was ‘not afraid’. He also said that he would go through 
passport control like any other citizen because he had a ‘clear conscience’. Here he 
was signalling a commitment to a long-cherished intelligentsia ideal: to live fearlessly 
according to the dictates of conscience and truth. With roots in stoic philosophy and 
Byzantine theology , ‘conscience’ is a term with a powerful resonance in Russia, and 
the focus for an ongoing cultural war about what the country stands for.   
  
Navalny’s remarks were a seeming riposte to a comment made by businessman 
Yevgenii Prigozhin. Prigozhin had encouraged Navalny to return to Russia and a 
possible prison sentence with the remark: ‘Serve your time and come out to freedom 
with a clear conscience’. As with Navalny, there were hints here of past tradition. On 
the door out of Butyrka prison—one of the prisons in which dissidents were held in 
the late Soviet era—there was a sign similar to Prigozhin’s phrase: ‘To freedom, with 
a clear conscience.’ Likewise, in one of the camps in the Mordovia region, there was 
a sign saying, ’Back to work, with a clear conscience’.  
 
Now Navalny is indeed in prison, with reports suggesting that he has been sent to 
the grim Penal Colony no. 2 outside the provincial town of Pokrov. The hope from 
the regime’s side may be that he can be ‘encouraged’ publicly to recant—as some of 
dissidents, under extreme pressure, did in the 1970s.  
 
The Soviet system always wanted to define ‘conscience’ on its own terms. Honesty, 
loyalty and proper behaviour were stressed, but generally within a pro-regime 
context.  A particular challenge was to help people not to feel guilty when 
committing acts normally regarded as crimes. Brutal methods were defended as 
necessary to defend the country from foreign threats, and moral doubts explained as 
a sign of reactionary thinking. Dissident author Lev Kopelev, who helped to 
implement collectivisation, was one influenced by the regime’s arguments. ‘Some 
sort of rationalistic fanaticism overcame my doubts, my pangs of conscience, and 
simple feelings of pity and shame,’ he recalled.  
 
Defining concepts like 'conscience' in terms of a certain pro-regime patriotism is also 
part of the Kremlin's current propaganda strategy. Destroying the idea that Navalny 
might be considered a person of integrity is part of that. The Putin team will have 
been delighted when Amnesty International revoked Navalny's status as a 'prisoner 
of conscience'. And they will be eager to emphasise Navalny's imperfections going 
forward—using people's past sins to undermine them is another of the Kremlin's  
favourite techniques.  
 
Yet controlling the narrative around ‘conscience’ is hard for Russia’s rulers, because 
there is so much in Russian culture coming from a more universal or personalistic 
perspective. For example, Russian literature has much to say about how people can 
get corrupted by power. ‘Oh, pity him whose conscience is unclean’, declares the 
Russian tsar, Boris Godunov, in Alexander Pushkin’s play of that name (1825).  
 
‘Conscience’ was a widely discussed term in the late Soviet era when people started 
to talk about the darker sides of Soviet history. Dissidents of all political persuasions 
often talked of conscience and the importance of overcoming lies. Solzhenitsyn's 
writings are full of characters struggling to retain their integrity in the face of 
repression. Some called Sakharov the ‘conscience’ of the country. Many in the 
intelligentsia, and in the Communist Party too, were eager to overcome the 
experience of living double lives. This moral unease played an important if unseen 
role in destabilising the Soviet system.   
 
The Putin administration wishes to emphasise the positives in Soviet history, hence 
its stress on the Soviet triumph over Nazi Germany. Undoubtedly, the resilience and 
courage of the Soviet soldier played a vital role in freeing the world from fascism. To 
the English reader, the publication of a translation of Grossman's novel Stalingrad a 
couple of years ago gives an insight into that. But the Kremlin may not want people 
to dig too deeply. Alongside the victory, there are some dark stains connected to the 
war and its origins. For example, the Nazi–Soviet pact is hardly something to be 
proud of. As with many national myths—British myths included—close probing often 
reveals a complicated picture. 
 
The debate about returning Dzerzhinsky's statue to Lubyanka Square reflects 
another variant in Russia's 'conscience wars'. For some in the security services 
Dzerzhinsky is an ethical role model: on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the 
Cheka in 2007, a medal of him was created calling him the ‘honour and conscience of 
the Soviet people’. The vote on restoring the statue—with Alexander Nevsky 
presented as an alternative to Dzerzhinsky—has now been put on hold by Moscow 
mayor Sergei Sobyanin because of its divisiveness. The Memorial Society stated that 
only a person 'devoid of conscience' could have conceived of such a vote.  
 
Russia’s rulers have often found it hard to control the ethical narrative. Like soap, it 
keeps slipping out of their hands. Part of the problem comes from the nature of life 
itself. To build something positive in any situation you need honest and intelligent 
people—like Navalny. But trouble can start if they ask awkward questions about why 
things are the way they are. That is the case anywhere—in Russia, China and the 
West. ‘Conscience’ can be politicised only up to a point, after which it starts to bite 
back.  
 
